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1 Miegunyah Public Lecture, University of Melbourne, 3 June 2010.   1
FAMINES PAST, FAMINE’S FUTURE 
  
  Words will never fully convey the horrors of famine, although many 
accounts, such as the following excerpt from Patrick Walker’s description of 
Scotland in the 1690s, have tried hard: 
 
Deaths and burials were so many and common that the living were 
wearied in the burying of the dead.  I have seen corpses drawn in sleds, 
many got neither coffin nor winding-sheet... I have seen some walking 
about the sun-setting, and tomorrow about six a-clock in the summer 
morning found dead in their houses, without making any stir at their 
death, their lead lying upon their hand, with as great a smell as if they 
had been four days dead, the mice or rats having eaten a great part of 
their hands and arms.
1 
 
Walker, a devout Presbyterian who made a living as a pedlar, dwelt on the 
macabre in order to remind his compatriots of how God punished grievous sin.  
Other accounts of famine have sought to inspire compassion rather than fear, as in 
the case of BBC reporter Michael Buerk’s famous television news report on the 
1984-5 Ethiopian famine.  In October 1984 Buerk referred to what he had just seen 
in Ethiopia as a ‘biblical famine, now, in the twentieth century…the closest thing 
to hell on earth’.  But the bible’s own depictions of famine are, if anything, more 
gruesome than the footage shown on the BBC—or, indeed, what Buerk saw in  2
Ethiopia.  Deuteronomy 28: 53-57 describes the effects of a siege in the seventh 
century BC as follows: 
 
You will then eat your own offspring, the flesh of the sons and daughters 
that the Lord your God has given you. . .  The man among you who is by 
nature tender and sensitive will turn against his brother, his beloved wife, 
and his remaining children.  He will withhold from all of them his children’s 
flesh that he is eating (since there is nothing else left). . .  Likewise, the 
most tender and delicate of your women, who would never think of putting 
even the sole of her foot on the ground because of her daintiness, will turn 
against her beloved husband, her sons and daughters, and will secretly eat 
her newborn children (since she has nothing else). . . 
 
And it seems almost as if the narrator of the following account of famine in 
Ukraine in 1932-33 had just been reading the Old Testament: 
 
There were cases when they buried half living people. ‘Good people, 
leave me alone. I am not dead’, the people used to cry. ‘Go to hell! You 
want us to come tomorrow again?’ was the reply.  In the cemetery they 
took from the dead everything that had some value and then threw 
them into the pit.  Thus it followed every day.  Every day there were 
cases of cannibalism.  Mothers killed their children and ate them up.  In 
such villages as Kordyshivka, Soshenske, [and] Pytiiv, cannibalism was  3
very widespread.  It was awfully dangerous for a person who looked good 
to go there.  I don’t know why people change so much.  Ukrainians are 




  Today such graphic accounts provoke a variety of responses: disbelief, 
revulsion, and pity.  Famine’s symptoms vary—for example, convincing evidence 
for cannibalism in the Scottish and Ethiopian cases cited above is lacking—but they 
are always horrific.  Are they likely to recur soon?  Can the history of past famines 
help answer this question? 
In what follows, I first outline some key findings of recent research into the 
symptoms and causes of famine.  I then discuss two long-term consequences of 
famine.  Finally I turn to the recent history of famine and what it might bode for 
the next decade or two. 
 
1a. ‘Natural Causes’ and Human Agency 
  Parodoxically, the century that witnessed the greatest famine on record also 
witnessed the virtual elimination (for now at least) of major famines.  The Great 
Leap Forward famine of 1959-61 was China’s last.  The era of famines in the 
former Soviet Union came to an end in 1946-47, while India’s last famine was in 
the state of Maharashtra in 1972-3, and the world’s most recent ‘biblical’ famine 
was arguably that described by Michael Buerk.  4
  Most historical famines, including that in Maharashtra, would not have 
occurred but for significant and, more than likely, repeated harvest shortfalls in a 
context of economic backwardness.  But the totalitarianism of Stalin, Mao, and 
their imitators is blamed for the Chinese and Soviet famines, and many other 
twentieth century famines.
3  The distinction between famines from ‘natural 
causes’ and other famines is useful: and it seems clear that human agency played a 
greater role in the major famines of the twentieth century than in earlier famines.  
But the distinction can be pressed too far.  In this respect Ralph Thaxton’s recent 
compelling and moving account of Do Fo, a village in Henan province, during the 
the Great Leap Forward famine of 1959-61 has a particular resonance.   
By way of context, Thaxton notes that living standards in Da Fo today are 
‘on par with those in rural Albania and the Philippines’
4.  A more appropriate 
comparison is that between living standards in those countries on the eve of the 
famine.  In terms of GDP per head in the mid-1950s, estimates of the Philippines’ 
advantage over China range from over two to one to about five to one (Table 1).  
Moreover, Da Fo is located in what was and remains one of China’s poorest regions.  
Table 2, drawn from the Penn World Tables, offers another perspective on China’s 
relative position, and shows that in 1957 Da Fo was located in the second poorest 
country in the world; in both 1952 and 1955 China was the poorest.
5   
 
 
Table 1. Real GDP per head in China, Albania, and the 
Phillipines 
Year Philippines  Albania  China  5
      
1950 1070  1001  448 
1955 1358  1181  577 
2005 2732  3508  5578 
Source: www.ggdc.net/maddison/ 
      
1950 251  n/a  n/a 
1955 357  n/a  67 
2004 4344  5056  5772 
Source : Heston, Summers and Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2  
 
 
Table 2. GDP per capita in the world’s four poorest 
economies, in 1952, 1955, and 1957 
1952 1955  1957 
China 59.2  China  67.3  Ethiopia  78.4 
Ethiopia 69.8  Ethiopia  73.9  China  79.6 
India 139.0  Malawi  83.8  Malawi  95.1 
Nigeria 158.4  India  147.7  India  159.6 
N 58    67    67 
Source: Heston, Summers and Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2  
 
  
Before the revolution China’s extreme economic backwardness had made it 
extremely vulnerable to harvest shortfalls, man-made and other. This, after all, 
was the country Walter Mallory had dubbed the ‘land of famine’ in the 1920s and 
where in the early 1930s the peasant, in the memorable simile of R. H. Tawney, 
was like ‘a man standing up to the neck in water, so that even a ripple is enough to  6
drown him’.
6  China cannot have been that different in the 1950s: by the late 
Angus Maddison’s reckoning Chinese GDP per head was no higher then than it had 
been in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
7  Surely, then, China’s underdevelopment 
cannot be entirely excluded in accounting for the Great Leap famine?  Surely too it 
was easier for a despot like Mao Tse Tung to exercise control and to wreak havoc in 
such an environment? The irony is that Thaxton’s account of an earlier famine in 
Henan has an exclusively traditional emphasis on ‘natural’ factors:
8 
 
In the spring of 1920, a severe drought gripped the lower part of the 
North China Plain, settling over northern Henan, western Shandong, and 
southern Hebei provinces.  This long drought extended into the spring of 
1921.  As a result, several million farmers perished in what came to be 
called the North China Famine of 1921… 
 
  Nor, of course, is it correct either to blame all earlier famines on 
overpopulation.  Many were caused or exacerbated by wars, and much—or at least 
some—of the excess mortality associated with others might have been avoided by 
more effective human action—as in, say, Ireland in the 1840s or India in the 1870s.  
The belief that elites might have done more to avert or mitigate disaster goes back 
much further than the nineteenth century; and so also does the sense that their 
legitimacy hinged on the insurance they offered against disaster.
9 
1b. Causes of Death  7
  During the twentieth century famine also changed how it kills.  
Traditionally, the immediate cause of most famine deaths was infectious diseases 
rather than literal starvation.  The exceptions are few and recent; they relate 
mainly to wartime famines in relatively advanced economic settings such as in 
Greece in 1942-43, Leningrad during the blockade, in the Warsaw ghetto before its 
destruction in April-May 1943, in the western Netherlands in 1944-45. During those 
famines the main causes of death shifted from typhus, typhoid fever, relapsing 
fever, dysentery, and malaria to hunger edema, muscular and alimentary 
dystrophy, and pneumonia.  The shift was due to a combination of improved public 
health and more effective medical knowledge and technology.  At the beginning of 
the Leningrad blockade in 1941, the Germans were terrified that their soldiers 
would be contaminated by epidemics if the city was occupied.
10  The spring thaw 
in 1942 presented a grave threat of epidemiological threat to Leningraders, but the 
public health regime was equal to the threat.  By mid-March ‘over 100,000 
tottering inhabitants, mostly women, were doing several hours of street cleaning a 
day, and the number continued to rise’.
11  However, this was not the case in 
Bengal in 1943-44, or in sub-Saharan Africa more recently.  
A conundrum here for famine specialists is the proximate causes of death 
during the greatest famine of all, the Chinese famine of 1959-61.  In pre-
revolutionary China, as might be expected, famine mortality was of the traditional 
kind and infectious diseases such as cholera and typhus were endemic. But most 
accounts of the cause of death in 1959-61 imply death by starvation rather than by 
disease.  Most accounts imply starvation, and Ralph Thaxton links most deaths in  8
Da Fo in 1960 to what he dubs ‘edema’, and this is also the finding of the most 
detailed study of this issue to date, that by Yixin Chen based on an analysis of 
public health gazetteers from Anhui province.
12  Does this mean that the Maoist 
public health campaigns of the early and mid-1950s influenced the causes of 
deaths during the Great Leap famine, but not the death toll itself?  
 
2. Markets and Famines 
  Human agency encompasses not just governance and culture but also 
institutions such as markets.  It is a long way from Dublin to Dacca but anyone who 
studies famines is confronted almost immediately by the Great Bengal Famine of 
1943-44, a famine which, thanks to the work of Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, has 
become almost paradigmatic. In Poverty and Famines (1981) and elsewhere Sen 
proposed and made popular an interpretation of famines that placed the emphasis 
less on food availability per se than on the impact of market malfunction on what 
he dubbed exchange entitlements, or the purchasing power of those who bought 
rather than consumed food.   
Sen’s focus on the distributional aspects of famine suffering was extremely 
valuable. He drove the point home by describing several instances where—so he 
claimed—famine occurred despite no ‘abnormal’ reduction in food output.  By 
implication those famines were zero-sum outcomes, with winners and losers, the 
winners being mainly those with access to land and credit.  This perspective 
highlighted the scope for redistribution but also intellectualized the populist  9
conviction throughout history that speculators, hoarders, and profiteers were 
responsible for turning food shortages into famine.   
However, a competing intellectual tradition, dating back to Adam Smith and 
the French economists, rejects such a possibility.  This is from the locus classicus: 
 
Without intending the interest of the people, the inland corn 
dealer is necessarily led, by a regard to his own interest, to treat 
them, even in years of scarcity, pretty much in the same manner as 
the prudent master of a vessel is sometimes obliged to treat his 
crew. When he foresees that provisions are likely to run short, he 
puts them upon short allowance… The unlimited, unrestrained 
freedom of the corn trade, as it is the only effectual preventative 
of the miseries of a famine, so it is the best palliative of the 
inconveniencies of a dearth; for the inconveniencies of a real 
scarcity cannot be remedied; they can only be palliated. No trade 
deserves more the full protection of the law, and no trade requires 




 Now, if markets move food from where it is relatively cheap to where it is 
relatively expensive, they are probably saving lives.  But are markets the ‘effectual 
preventative’ that Smith claimed?  My own research points to instances where 
markets in the past did not exacerbate famine.
14  In nineteenth century Ireland  10
and India, where Smith’s views held sway and governments did not interfere with 
trade, the trouble usually was not that markets functioned perversely, but that 
they worked too slowly.  In both cases, the lack of food encouraged some canny 
merchants to import more and export less food.  But existing transport 
technologies meant that it took months for them to respond, and the uncertainties 
accompanying that very delay deterred many other merchants from trying their 
luck.
15  So markets were no panacea either because, to quote economist John 
Maynard Keynes out of context, ‘in the long run we are all dead’. 
  NGOs and the international media are still prone to blame famine on market 
malfunction, but evidence that reduced market integration or excessive storage 
made famines worse in the recent past is weak.  Corni and Deotti’s study of Niger 
in 2005 rejects the claim that the rise in consumer prices stemmed from market 
balkanization during the crisis, while Jenny Aker reckons that grain markets in 
Niger were more integrated than normal during drought years such as 2005. Thus 
contrary to media claims, markets did not ‘fail’ in Niger during the 2005 crisis.
16 
Today, thanks to huge reductions in the cost of transport and information, markets 
have the power to work much more effectively than in the past.   
  
 
3. Long-run Consequences 
  A Kashmiri proverb states that ‘famine goes, but the stains remain’. Even 
where famines are a thing of the past, they often have an after-life. This section 
focuses briefly on two aspects of the long-run impact of famine.    11
The first concerns collective memory of famine.  A key theme of the 
sesquicentennial commemorations of the Great Irish Famine in the mid-1990s was 
that the Irish everywhere shared a collective or common memory of that 
catastrophe.  The inclusive, first person plural language of so much of the 
commemorative rhetoric—‘we are a first world country with a third world memory 
of famine, dislocation, and exile...  Our own famine echoes are constantly with 
us’, ‘an event which traumatised this country’, ‘this country’, ‘a country with a 
memory’, ‘our own’, ‘our memory’—suggested collective memory in spades.  An 
event which pitted ‘me’ against ‘you’ was remembered as ‘us’ and ‘we’. But a 
divisive disaster that pitted not only the poor against the rich, but neighbour 
against neighbour and young against old, was hardly promising material for a 
communal, collective memory.  It was almost as if the famine caused virtually all 
those living in Ireland during the famine to die or emigrate, with identical knock-
on effects on their traumatised descendants.  But how could the memory of such a 
divisive disaster be truly collective?  Surely, only by glossing over and filtering out 
much of the history of the famine?  Collective memory, of course, always tells us 
more about the present than the past.  By contrast, history—and this includes 
folklore and oral history—is complex and multifaceted, though hardly value-free 
either.
17 
Nowhere today is famine memory more contested than in Ukraine.  Former 
president Viktor Yushchenko championed a collective memory of the famine of 
1932-33—what came to be called the Holomodor in the 1980s as genocide—but 
which his successor Viktor Yanukovich prefers to describe as a ‘tragedy’.  Some  12
bloggers were quick to note that Yanukovych’s ‘first act’ was to remove the 
Holodomor dedication on the presidential website.
18  In Ukraine memory competes 
with history, and breeds an embittered victimhood stakes that sometimes places 
the famine on a par with the Jewish Holocaust. 
In neighbouring Moldova too, famine memory is fiercely contested.  In late 
2006, the Moldovan legislature rejected an attempt to provide ‘a political and 
legal appreciation’ of the 1946-1947 Moldovan famine. One opposition deputy 
claimed that the famine was the ‘result of the premeditated policy promoted by 
the Stalinist regime’ while another argued that the refusal of the majority to 
engage on the issue was ‘a blasphemy towards the victims of those years’.  A 
government supporter retorted that while there was no denying that there had 
been a famine, it had ‘a pragmatic explanation historically demonstrated: the 
difficult post-war period, the poor crops, and the drought’. Stalin shared the 
blame, but only insofar as he did not react in time.
19 
There are times when, as the American writer and activist David Rieff has 
recently argued, it is better to forget: 
 
The wars of the Yugoslav Succession were inflamed by 
remembrance—above all the Serb remembrance of the defeat at 
Kosovo Polje in 1389. In the hills of Bosnia, I learned to hate but 
above all to fear collective historical memory. In its appropriation 
of history, which had been my abiding passion and refuge since 
childhood, collective memory made history itself seem like nothing  13
so much as an arsenal full of the weapons needed to keep wars 
going or peace tenuous and cold. What I saw after Bosnia, in 
Rwanda, in Kosovo, in Israel-Palestine, and in Iraq, gave me no 
basis for changing my mind. 
 
Over a century ago Irish politician and social reformer Horace Plunkett famously 
urged that ‘Anglo-Irish history is for Englishmen to remember, for Irishmen to 
forget’.
20 For ‘history’ read ‘collective memory’, not ‘history’. 
A second, quite different long-term result of famine is an extension of the 
‘fetal origins’ hypothesis, i.e. the claim that malnutrition in the womb and in early 
infancy compromises health in adulthood.  The earliest famine study to focus on 
this issue was an analysis of the long-term impact of the Dutch Hungerwinter of 
1944-45.  Inevitably most famines do not yield the kind of data needed to test for 
birth-cohort effects; but subsequent studies refer to the Dutch Potato Famine of 
1846-47, the Great Finnish Famine of 1867-68, the Leningrad siege-famine of 1941-
43, and the Chinese famine of 1959-61. Until very recently such studies were 
primarily exercises in medical history, published in medical journals. They 
identified links between being born or being young during or in the wake of a 
famine, on the one hand, and ailments in later life ranging from heart disease and 
cancer to mental illness and obesity, on the other.  A study based on evidence 
from Anhui province, for example, finds that children conceived in 1959-61 stood 
twice as high a risk of becoming schizophrenics as those conceived either before or 
after the famine, while evidence from St. Petersburg links malnutrition during  14
puberty with increased incidence of heart disease and increased mortality from 
strokes.
21   
More recently, economists have made their own distinctive contribution to 
this literature, by drawing attention to the economic consequences of being born 
in a famine cohort.  Thus, a second study of the Chinese famine finds that for 
those who were one year old at its onset, exposure on average reduced adult 
height by 2 per cent, weight by 6 per cent, weight-for-height and upper arm 
circumference by 4 four per cent, labor supply by 7 per cent, and schooling by 3 
per cent. A third study finds that being in the famine cohort increased male 
illiteracy by 7 per cent, the probability of not being working by 2.4 per cent, and 
the probability of being disabled by 13 per cent.  Men were 3.5 per cent less likely 
to be married, and 5 per cent more likely to have never married.
22  And there is 
evidence that the damage extends to the third generation: yet another study of 
the Chinese famine finds that children of a parent born during the famine were 
smaller and lighter, and that the effect was greater for boys than for girls.
23 Such 
findings imply that the human cost of famines is greater than previously thought. 
 
 
4. Never Say Never! 
A study published a decade ago
24 claimed that famine was responsible for 70 
million deaths during the twentieth century, or more than either world war.  But 
the previous century was probably worse, at least relatively speaking.  Thirty 
million is a lower-bound estimate of famine mortality in India and China alone  15
between 1870 and 1902, while a figure of ‘fifty million dead might not be 
unrealistic’.
25   
Recent famines, by contrast, have been ‘small’.  Since the high-profile 
crises of Malawi in 2002 and of Niger in 2005 famine has not been front-page news.  
The natural disasters that make the headlines nowadays are no longer famines, but 
earthquakes.  The death tolls in Malawi and Niger shrink into insignificance 
compared to those of earthquakes in Turkey in August 1999, in Java in May 2006, in 
Sichuan in May 2008, in Haiti in January 2010, or of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 
December 2004.  Morever, since the 1980s the human cost of famine in Africa has 
been dwarfed by that of HIV-AIDS.  HIV-AIDS kills about two million annually in 
Africa, more than any African famine on record.  In Malawi and in Niger in the mid-
2000s the annual death tolls from HIV/AIDS were eighty thousand and seven 
thousand, respectively.
26   
So has famine lost its deadly sting?  Forecasting future prospects for the 
eradication of famine is a mug’s game.  Stanford biologist Paul Ehrlich’s notorious 
doomsday forecasts of the 1960s are the most notorious cases in point.  His 
confident prediction of global famine in the 1970s—‘hundreds of millions of 
people…going to starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked on 
now’—got it almost exactly wrong. In 1980 a second expert wrote of a future 
‘globe-girdling Future Famine Zone’, while in 1967 a volume with the disturbing 
title Famine 1975! America’s Decision: Who Will Survive defined India, Egypt and 
Haiti as beyond help and therefore not worth assisting. It was in this gloomy 
context that ecologist Garrett Hardin in 1974 proposed his ‘lifeboat ethics: the  16
case against helping the poor’ whereby the really hopeless cases should be let 
drown.
27  
  Less famously, perhaps, in 1963 the Indian state of Maharashtra passed a law 
called ‘The Maharashtra Deletion of the Term ‘Famine’ Act’, which removed all 
references to ‘famine’ in statutes referring to public relief.  The preamble reads: 
 
WHEREAS the agricultural situation in the State is constantly watched 
by the State Government, and relief measures as warranted by the 
situation are provided as soon as signs of scarcity conditions are 
apparent, so that there is no scope for famine conditions to develop: 
 
AND WHEREAS the term ‘famine’ in the Bombay State Famine Relief 
Fund Act, 1958 and other laws on the subject in their application to 
the State has now become obsolete, and requires therefore to be 
deleted therefrom; It is hereby enacted in the Fourteenth Year of the 
Republic of India as follows….
28 
 
  Less than a decade later, Maharashtra was struck by India’s last famine (so 
far), in which ‘at very least’ seventy thousand people perished.
29 
 
  With such caveats in mind, is there any point in peering ahead?  Yes, insofar 
as studying the past helps identify what makes famine more likely.  What follows,  17
accordingly, is less a forecast than a review of those factors that would affect the 
likelihood of famine over the next decade or two. 
 
4.1. First Some Bad News 
It is not easy to conjure exceptions to Amartya Sen’s ‘law’ that democracy 
and famine don’t mix.
30  Malawi in 2002 might seem to be one—a Malawian 
member of parliament declared at the height of the crisis that ‘if we don't handle 
the food crisis well, it will be difficult to convince people to vote for us’—although 
that would be stretching the definitions of both democracy and famine.
31  
Maharashtra in 1972-73 offers another partial exception, although accounts of that 
famine stress how much worse it might have been but for the relief efforts of the 
authorities.
32  Recent evidence from famine’s last redoubts suggests that change is 
in the right direction but very slow.  The problem is that while democracy may 
prevent famine, democracy is also less likely, and less likely to last, in 
environments where famine is a risk.  Table 3 offers one crude measure of the link 
between the quality of governance and economic development.  The correlation 
between GDP per head and life expectancy at birth, on the one hand, and 
measures of good governance, on the other, is clear.  Thus, for example, the 
correlation between corruption and life expectancy across Asian countries is -




TABLE 3. Governance, GDP, and Life Expectancy  
  18
A. Correlations with ln GDP per capita 
Index World  Africa  Asia  L America  Other 
Corruption -.734  -.358  -.820  -.566 -.760 
Democracy +.627  +.096  +.566  +.412 +.737 
Press Freedom  +.503  -.013  +.265  +.196 +.737 
           
B. Correlations with e[0] 
Index World  Africa  Asia  L America  Other 
Corruption -.632  -.275  -.734  -.572 -.804 
Democracy +.716  -.151  +.510  +.273 +.790 
Press Freedom  +.393  -.283  +.248  -.029 +.748 




The second piece of bad news concerns climate change.  The link between 
adverse climate change and increased vulnerability to drought and famine is 
obvious and much commented on.  There are doubts about the ability of politics to 
deliver on this issue.  What of economics?  Two centuries ago economics was 
known as the dismal science; today, if anything, it leans in the other direction.  In 
the spirit of the celebrated wager pitting economist Julian Simon against 
geographer Paul Ehrlich a generation ago, economists are more inclined to rely on 
human resilience and market forces in the struggle against climate change than are 
meteorologists or environmentalists.  In 1980 Ehrlich predicted that the real price 
of five commodity metals selected by him would rise during the following decade, 
reflecting increasing pressure on resources.  He lost the bet.  A recent exercise 
replicating the original Simon-Ehrlich wager for 1990-2005 produces the same 
outcome.
33  Simon attributed his win to the ability of human agents to economize 
on the metals through substitutes, and their discovery of new ways of producing  19
them. The question is not how climate change would affect our environment, other 
things being equal, but how well mankind can adapt to the challenge.  ‘Greener’ 
technologies would be part of the solution, but so too would inventing more heat-
resistant technologies. 
Here history contains some clues.  A noteworthy example is the research of 
economic historians Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode on how nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century American agronomists and farmers adapted wheat production to 
the harsher climate of the midwestern United States. Olmstead and Rhode argue 
that the new hard red varieties developed and diffused in this period coped well 
with temperature changes of 2 to 5 degrees centigrade.
34  Now, Africa is not North 
America, and adapting to colder climes may be technologically easier than 
adapting to global warming.  But the Olmstead-Rhode study hints at possibilities 
that should not be ruled out.  
The third piece of bad news is war.  Throughout history wars have caused or 
exacerbated famine, and the experience of World War II highlights the 
vulnerability of even relatively wealthy economies to total war.  Today famine is a 
serious threat only in places seriously threatened by war or autarky.  In recent 
years the FAO has produced an annual list of countries requiring external food 
assistance, and giving the reasons why.  It divides countries at risk into three 
categories: those facing exceptional shortfalls in aggregate production/supplies; 
those suffering ‘widespread lack of access’, and those faced by ‘severe localized 
food insecurity’.  As the data in Table 4, which refer to 2009, make clear, more 
often than not, the main reason given for food insecurity were civil conflict, poor  20
governance, or the burden placed by HIV/AIDS, rather than adverse weather or 





TABLE 4. COUNTRIES IN CRISIS REQUIRING EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE 
 
Nature of Food 





in aggregate food 
production/supplies 
  
   
Kenya  Adverse weather, lingering 
effects of civil strife 
144  4.56 
Lesotho  Low productivity, HIV/AIDS 
pandemic 
155  3.06 
Somalia  Conflict, economic crisis, 
adverse weather 
--  6.04 
Swaziland  Low productivity, HIV/AIDS 
pandemic 
141  3.45 
Zimbabwe  Problems of economic 
transition 
--  3.19 
Iraq  Conflict and inadequate rainfall  --  4.26 
Widespread lack of 
access        
Eritrea  Adverse weather, IDPs, 
economic constraints 
164  4.72 
Liberia  War related damage  176  6.77 
Mauritania  Several years of drought  140  4.37 
Sierra Leone  War related damage  179  5.00 
Afghanistan  Conflict and insecurity, 
inadequate rainfall 
181  7.07 
North Korea  Economic constraints   --  1.85  21
 
 
TABLE 4, cont. 
 
Nature of Food 




Severe localized food 
insecurity        
Burundi  Civil strife, IDPs and returnees  174  6.80 
CAR  Refugees, insecurity in parts  179  4.58 
Chad  Refugees, conflict  175  5.31 
Congo  IDPs  136  4.49 
Côte d'Ivoire  Conflict related damage  163  4.46 
DR Congo  Civil strife, returnees  176  6.20 
Ethiopia  Adverse weather, Insecurity in 
parts 
171  6.12 
Guinea  Refugees, conflict related 
damage 
170  5.20 
Guinea-Bissau  Localized insecurity  173  4.65 
Sudan 
Civil strife (Darfur), insecurity 
(southern Sudan), localized 
crop failure 
150  4.23 
Uganda  Localized crop failure, 
insecurity 
157  6.77 
Bangladesh Cyclones  146  2.74 
Iran Past  drought    88  2.04 
Myanmar Past  cyclone  138  2.07 
Nepal  Poor market access and drought   144  2.64 
Pakistan  Conflict  141  3.52 
Sri Lanka  Conflict, IDPs  102  1.99 
Timor-Leste  IDPs  162  6.53 
Source: 





4.2. Malawi and Niger 
  The recent crises in Malawi and Niger contain some lessons about the history 
and, hopefully, the future of famine.  Malawi was the epicentre of a broader food 
crisis threatening southern Africa in 2001-02. In April 2002 Malawi’s president 
declared a state of emergency and asked for $21 million to deal with a crisis that  22
had put three-quarters of the population at risk. UN agencies and NGOs set about 
addressing Malawi’s ‘worst food crisis in half a century’.
35 Reports followed of 
people resorting to substitute foods such as banana roots, boiled maize husks, and 
pumpkin leaves, of an alarming increase in the number of tuberculosis cases, and 
one of Malawi’s ‘worst ever’ cholera epidemics.
36   
  Yet the resultant death toll was miniscule. In March 2002 an official source 
reported that around one hundred Malawians had died from hunger-related 
illnesses since the beginning of the year, while NGO sources informed the BBC that 
‘more than 300 people ha[d] died of hunger’ in the previous last two months.
37  In 
May the BBC reported that ‘officially more than 100 people starved to death by 
March in Kasungu’, the worst affected district, in Malawi’s ‘worst-ever’ famine. 
The higher estimates of ‘at least 500-1,000’ and ‘1,000-3,000’ proposed by 
Stephen Devereux
38 imply is an increase of about one per cent above the normal 
death rate. 
  In late 2005 Malawi was in trouble again, with aid agencies claiming that ‘at 
least five million people face starvation this winter’, the World Food Programme 
declaring a funding shortfall of ‘at least $70 million’, and the government warning 
that without outside help 'hundreds of thousands of Malawians will die'.
39  Happily, 
no crisis materialized.  Since 2005 a series of favourable seasons and generous 
subsidies through cheap fertilizers have increased maize output substantially.
40  By 
2008/9 Malawi was a net exporter of maize, and it was almost as if its food supply 
problems were in the past.  But if Malawi’s recent famines or near-famines have 
been exaggerated, predicting the future on the basis of a few good years in  23
succession is equally foolhardy.  Whether seed and fertilizer subsidies offer an 
enduring and sustainable cure for economic backwardness remains moot.  The 
trouble is that subsidies are of least assistance to poor farmers dependent on 
marginal soils and that the long-term viability of a programme that subsidizes two 
million cultivators out of the public purse is questionable. 
  Niger is a landlocked country constrained by an ecologically fragile resource 
base, and with a rate of population growth that leaves the margin over subsistence 
worryingly tight.  Robert Malthus, a technological pessimist, would have been 
dumbfounded at the ability of Niger’s farm sector to keep pace with a population 
that was increasing at 3-4 per cent annually.  Its ability to do so implies significant 
productivity gains in order to stand still—and considerable resilience in a context of 
threatened soil erosion and, indeed, desertification.  In semi-technical jargon, 
keeping food supplies per head constant when population is growing at such a pace 
requires greater efficiency and productivity gains than those achieved by European 
agriculture before World War 2.
41 
  Niger’s crisis was one of the biggest news stories of the summer of 2005. 
Once again it was the BBC who broke the story.  ‘We are going to lose many, many 
thousands of lives’, predicted John O’Shea of the Irish NGO GOAL two days after 
Hilary Andersson’s report from Zinder province.
42 On the same day, UN spokesman 
Jan Egeland accused the international community of reacting slowly to the crisis: 
later he declared that more donations were received in the week following the BBC 
broadcast than in the previous six months.  The same broadcast prompted the  24
boast from O’Shea claimed that GOAL had ‘fed more people in its first week in 
Niger than the UN had this year’.
43 
  Graphic and apocalyptic accounts of the disaster in Niger followed. There 
were reports of rocketing prices, poor harvests, severe drought, and locust 
infestations.  Estimates of 3.5 or 3.6 million people at imminent risk of starvation—
almost invariably including 0.8 million children—were much recycled.  According to 
Oxfam’s regional director in West Africa, ‘families [we]re feeding their children 
grass and leaves from the trees to keep them alive.’ After briefing from Médicins 
sans frontières Hilary Andersson reported from Zinder province, the epicentre of 
the crisis, on September 15
th: ‘This is the only part of Niger where anyone has even 
tried to estimate how many people have starved to death. And the indications are 
that just in this town and the villages immediately surrounding it, thousands of 
people have died in the last few months.’ 
In reality crisis-induced excess mortality in Niger was almost certainly 
minimal.  A scholarly study published in 2008 attempted to estimate mortality on 
the basis of a sample survey carried out in the wake of the crisis.
44  The highest 
daily mortality rate found was 0.7 per 10,000 in Zinder province; the estimate for 
Niger as a whole was 0.4 per 10,000.  The authors conclude that Niger constituted 
a ‘food crisis’ but not a ‘famine’.  Indeed, had the aggregate daily rate lasted a 
year, it would convert to an annual rate less than 15 per thousand, or considerably 
less than the annual death rate reported by international agencies for Niger in the 
early 2000s.  25
  The 2005 crisis is worth comparing with that of 1931, when drought and 
locusts destroyed most of the staple millet crop, because the comparison offers 
evidence of progress made in the interim.  First, the 1931 famine’s toll in terms of 
deaths and emigration exceeded 150,000, with excess mortality in the tens of 
thousands.
45  Second, colonial tax exactions were a factor, as was the paucity of 
aid from the colonial power.  During 1931 food aid totalled 140 tons for the 0.5 
million living in the three worst-hit districts of Niamey, Dosso, and Tillabery, and 
much of that aid was in the form of loans.  In the following year the authorities 
took their responsibilities more seriously, but food ordered for Niamey and 
Tillabery in late 1931 had yet to arrive in July 1932.  Relief was therefore both 
inadequate and slow.
46  Third, the price of millet more than quintupled at its peak 
during the third quarter of 1931, whereas in 2005 the price at most doubled.  Most 
vulnerable in 1931 were those nomadic pastoralists who relied on the market for 
their food, and who saw their entitlements dwindle to almost nothing as livestock 
prices plummeted and food prices soared.  Only the need to fund their tax burdens 
drove farmers to the market.  In sum, the contrast between 1931 and 2005 could 
not be starker.  Today the main burden facing Niger is its fertility rate, apparently 
the highest in the world (see Table 5).
47  It has been largely spared the catastrophe 
of HIV/AIDS, an affliction largely absent in the Muslim countries of north and 
western Africa.  
  26
 
Table 5. Malawi and Niger: Some Demographic Indicators 
 NIGER  MALAWI 
 1990  2000  2007  1990  2000  2007 
<5 MR  303.5  229.5  175.5  209.4  169.5  110.5 
TFR 7.88  7.55  6.95    6.92  6.20  5.59  




   0.8      11.9 




One reason why natural disasters pose less of a threat today is the 
globalization of relief and the ubiquity of NGOs that specialize in disaster relief. 
Today in Ireland alone there are over 120-140 NGOs with a ‘development’ remit, 
while globally the number of aid workers has grown from an estimated 136,000 in 
1997 to an estimated 242,000 in 2005 and 290,000 in 2008.
48 Haiti in 2010 and the 
Indian Ocean tsunami in late 2006 testify to their efficacy in soliciting and 
distributing relief.   
Some of the best-known NGOs have their origins in the relief of particular 
famines.  Africa Concern—now Concern Worldwide—and Médecins sans frontières 
were born in the wake of the Biafran secession in the late 1960s whereas Oxfam 
began as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, a group campaigning for the 
relief of wartime Greece.  What sometimes begins as famine relief culminates in 
development aid.  The crisis of 2005 drew the Irish charity GOAL to Niger, just as 
the Ethiopian famine of 1984 had drawn it to Ethiopia and the crisis of 2002 had 
drawn it to Malawi.  It remained on in all three places, to embark on ‘sustainable 
development programmes’ paid for in large part out of public funds.
49    27
As bureaucracies NGOs are arguably better geared to addressing structural 
problems such as ill-health and illiteracy than once-off disasters.  But in financial 
terms they require disasters in order to sustain their other activities.  In Ireland, 
for example, GOAL and Concern used Niger in 2005 to launch campaigns focusing 
on the 3.5 million who were starving (GOAL) or the ‘over 3.6 milllion [who] need 
food now’ (Concern).  Trócaire attempted a different tactic, using the crisis as an 
opportunity to launch an ‘Africa Crisis Appeal’ in aid of ‘up to 20 million 
people…now at risk and urgently requir[ing] help’.   
The tension between the public’s relative lack of interest in development 
programmes and the bureaucratic need of the NGO to survive between disasters is 
a problem for NGOs.  The problem was highlighted in a recent controversy about 
the role of NGOs in Niger.  The prize-winning Norwegian documentary, Sultbløffen 
[‘The Famine Scam’], attacked Hilary Andersson and Médecins san frontières, her 
main source of information, for misrepresenting the Niger crisis.  For MSF, ‘all the 
signs were blinking red’, but for its Norwegian critics, with well-placed informants 
in situ, those signs spelled malnutrition, which was endemic, not impending 
famine.  MSF based its claims on an increase in the number of visitors its ongoing 
nutritional programmes, rather lamely arguing:  
 
This motivation has nothing to do with raising more funds, 
but simply with raising awareness for a forgotten crisis that causes 
many unnecessary deaths, but that has been considered to be  28
normal because we got used to a under-five-mortality rate of 200 
children out of every 1,000 newborn.
50  
 
It would seem that MSF had, in effect, cried wolf in Niger.  As Alex de Waal 
put it, ‘the Niger crisis is an example of how a crisis in an African country is 
portrayed according to a particular script which doesn’t actually necessarily fit the 
reality of that crisis’.
51  Both the Niger and Malawi examples should be set against 
the historical lesson that even in very poor countries once-off harvest failures and 
attendant price spikes do not necessarily produce famine in peacetime.  Such 
events were common enough for people to insure against them: to deny this is to 
deny the prudence and resilience of the very poor.   
If the news from Niger and Malawi offers some cause for tempered 
optimism, are there other hopeful signs?  One is the huge increase in global 
productivity.  Angus Maddison’s estimates imply that global GDP per head of 
population rose fivefold during the twentieth century, and has almost quadrupled 
since mid-century (Table 6).  And there are reasons to believe that such 
calculations underestimate the true increase in global living standards.
52  A by-
product of this growth has been a vastly improved capacity to store food and to 
ship it long distances at short notice. 
Naturally, the growth in food output has not been commensurate.  FAO data 
suggest that world food output (in kcals rather than in dollars) has risen by nearly 
four-fifths since 1980, or considerably faster than population (which has increased 
by half).  So, in global terms, the margin over subsistence is now much wider than  29
it was a generation ago.  This also holds for former famine zones such as India and 
Bangladesh, whereas China, once the ‘land of famine’, nowadays faces a growing 
problem of childhood obesity.  In Africa, where malnutrition and destitution is 
greatest, the recent record is mixed, however, and leaves no room for 
complacency.  Figure 1 shows Africa as a whole performing better than Southern 
Africa, and food outstripping population in both Niger and Malawi in the recent 
past.  The future course of population growth is crucial; and science writer Fred 
Pearce may well be right that current UN population projections underestimate the 
prospects for ‘softer’ demographic adjustment through fertility decline in the 
world’s poorest regions.
53  
The productivity gap between Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world 
has been widening.
54  In the 1970s GDP per head in China was not much higher than 
in Malawi or Niger; today it is ten to twelve times as high.  There are no easy 
solutions to bridging that gap.  Yet given the productive capacity of humankind in 
the modern era, famines in even the poorest economies are avoidable scandals.  It 




Table 6. GDP per head 1820-2008 [in 1990 PPP-adjusted dollars] 
 
Year World  W  Europe  USA  Africa 
1820 666  1194  1257  420 
1900 1261  2885  4091  601 
1950 2111  4569  9561  889 
1975 4087  11493  16284  1395 
2008 7614  21672  31178  1447 
 Source: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/ 
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